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Abstract
The future of policing will be driven by data. Crime, criminals, and
patterns of criminal activity will be reduced to data to be studied, crunched,
and predicted. The benefits of big data policing involve smarter policing,
faster investigation, predictive deterrence, and the ability to visualize crime
problems in new ways. Not surprisingly then, police administrators have
been seeking out new partnerships with sophisticated private data companies
and experimenting with new surveillance technologies.
This potential future, however, has a very present limitation. It is a
limitation largely ignored by adopting jurisdictions and could, if left
unaddressed, delegitimize the adoption and use of new data-driven
technologies. Simply put: all big data policing technologies have a “black
data” problem. “Black data” connotes three overlapping concerns. First,
big data policing is opaque, lacking transparency because most of the magic
happens as a result of “black box” proprietary and mathematically complex
algorithms. Second, big data policing is racially encoded, colored by the
history of real-world policing that disproportionality impacts communities of
color. Finally, big data policing faces legal uncertainty as old constitutional
doctrines built on small data principles no longer work in the new big data
age. The future path of traditional Fourth Amendment law is uncertain, dark,
and distorted.
This brief essay, part of a symposium at Ohio State Law School on
Criminal Law, Big Data, and the Promotion of Justice, seeks to raise the
questions that must be resolved to overcome the black data problem. This
symposium essay examines: (1) the puzzle of data-driven transparency; (2)
the concern of biased data; and (3) the struggle for constitutional clarity in
the face of new technologies.

*
Professor of Law, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law. Thank you to Ric Simmons for the
invitation to present in this Ohio State Law School symposium on Criminal Law, Big Data, and the
Promotion of Justice.
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I.INTRODUCTION
The future of policing will be driven by data. Crime, criminals, and patterns of
criminal activity will be reduced to data to be studied, crunched, and predicted. 1
Police departments across the United States—like the civilian population—will
learn to adapt to ever-shifting technological innovations and efficiencies.2 The
question of adoption is not “if,” but “when,” and any delay largely will be a function
of money and police culture.
The benefits of big data policing involve smarter policing, faster investigation,
predictive deterrence, and the ability to visualize crime problems in new ways.3 Not
surprisingly then, police administrators have been seeking out new partnerships with
sophisticated private data companies and experimenting with new surveillance
technologies.4 In Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, Miami, Boston, and other
smaller cities and towns, the beginning of a big data policing mindset is developing.5
This potential future, however, has a very present limitation. It is a limitation
largely ignored by adopting jurisdictions and could, if left unaddressed, delegitimize

1
See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1113 (2017); Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data
in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947 (2016).
2
See Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from WalMart and Amazon About Fighting Crime in a Recession?, POLICE CHIEF (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/predictive-policing-what-can-we-learn-from-wal-mart-andamazon-about-fighting-crime-in-a-recession/.
3
See generally Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOCI. REV.
977 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 327 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89
WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV.
1 (2017).
4
See, e.g., Mark Harris, How Peter Thiel’s Secretive Data Company Pushed into Policing,
WIRED (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretive-datacompany-pushed-into-policing/; Jacques Peretti, Palantir: The ‘Special Ops’ Tech Giant that Wields
as much Real-World Power as Google, THE GUARDIAN (July 30, 2017, 9:59 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/30/palantir-peter-thiel-cia-data-crime-police.
5
See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 1115–17.
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the adoption and use of new data-driven technologies. Simply put: all big data
policing technologies have a “black data” problem.6
As I have written previously, “black data” connotes three overlapping
concerns.7 First, big data policing is opaque, lacking transparency because most of
the magic happens as a result of “black box” proprietary and mathematically
complex algorithms.8 Second, big data policing is racially encoded, colored by the
history of real-world policing that disproportionality impacts communities of color.9
Police data comes from the real world, and all of the long-standing discriminatory
impacts of implicit and explicit bias color that data.10 Black data is black, brown,
and marked by disproportionate impacts on communities of color.11 Finally, big
data policing faces legal uncertainty as old constitutional doctrines built on small
data principles no longer work in the new big data age.12 The future path of
traditional Fourth Amendment law is uncertain, dark, and distorted. These different
types of darkness make it difficult to see the future clearly. Black data must be
illuminated so that the positive elements of algorithmic insights and crime
prevention can be used without negatively impacting privacy, liberty, or the wellbeing of citizens subject to new forms of police surveillance.
To work as intended, big data policing technologies must address this lack of
transparency, the legacy of racial discrimination, and the constitutional uncertainty
arising from application in the real world. This brief essay, part of a symposium on
Criminal Law, Big Data, and the Promotion of Justice, seeks to raise the questions
that must be resolved to overcome the black data problem. This symposium essay
examines: (1) the puzzle of data-driven transparency; (2) the concern of biased data;
and (3) the struggle for constitutional clarity in the face of new technologies.

6
ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND
THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 3–4, 131 (2017).
7
8
9
10
11
12

Id. at 3.
Id. at 136–40.
Id. at 131–36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–42.
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II.THE GROWTH OF BIG DATA POLICING
To ground our discussion, it is important to be clear about the type of
technologies which might fall under the big data policing tent.13 At present, there
are three broad categories of technology: predictive technologies, surveillance
technologies, and data mining technologies—all are data-driven innovations which
have been adopted by law enforcement to augment police strategies of deterrence,
monitoring, and investigation.14
First, predictive analytics are being used by law enforcement in the form of
place-based predictive policing and person-based targeting.15

Both of these

strategies share the same core approach that algorithms can be developed to identify
risk patterns from collected police data.16 For example, place-based predictive
policing might take historic crime data, or environmental risk factors, or some
combination thereof, and combine it with other variables (day of the week, time,
weather, etc.) to forecast crimes.17 The data can be fed into a computer model that
seeks to identify geographic areas that may be more at risk of crime than other areas,

13

See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 352–73.
See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 104–05 (2014) (predictive analytics); Rachel
Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing
Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 534 (2017) (surveillance); Steven D. Seybold,
Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1029,
1032 (2015) (surveillance); Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN
ST. L. REV. 285, 287 (2011) (data mining).
15 Predictive Policing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, NAT'L INST. JUST.,
http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/strategies/predictive-policing/Pages/welcome.aspx
[https://perma.cc/525K-ZGMX] (last modified June 9, 2014).
16 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 1126–28.
17 See
AZAVEA,
HUNCHLAB:
UNDER
THE
HOOD
(2015),
https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf; How PredPol Works,
PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017);
RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., RISK TERRAIN MODELING COMPENDIUM (Joel M. Caplan & Leslie W.
Kennedy eds., 2011).
14
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either because of crime patterns, risks in the environment, or some other factor.18
The outputs—usually maps of micro-areas of forecast risk—can be provided to
police officers as they patrol, thus allowing police to effectively respond to crime
patterns in a city.19 Person-based targeting involves using past data about criminal
activities (arrests, age at the time of offense, criminal associates, past violence, etc.)
and then using that information to predict those individuals most at risk of violence
(either as victims or perpetrators).20 In places like Chicago, Illinois, the Strategic
Subjects List (the so-called “heat list”) of targeted individuals ranks the people
deemed most at-risk in the city.21 Police and social service interventions can be
planned around this list as sort of a public health strategy to prevent future
violence.22 In addition, the numerical risk score is displayed on the dashboard of
police computers, advising police officers of the relative risk of the individual they
happen to be stopping.23
Surveillance technologies in the form of monitoring advancements can watch,
hear, smell, sense, and automatically record and respond to things occurring in

18 See George O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 94
J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015); Aaron Mendelson, Can LAPD Anticipate Crime with ‘Predictive
Policing’?,
THE
CAL. REP.
(Sept. 9, 2013),
https://www.scpr.org/programs/taketwo/2013/09/09/33630/can-lapd-anticipate-crime-with-predictive-policing/ [https://perma.cc/ZQS22ZJ2].
19 See Tessa Stuart, Santa Cruz’s Predictive Policing Experiment, SANTACRUZ.COM (Feb. 14,
2012),
http://www.santacruz.com/news/santa_cruzs_predictive_policing_experiment.html
[https://perma. cc/U2YD-VPYC].
20 Jeremey Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB.
(Aug.
21,
2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list20130821_1_chicago-police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list
[https://perma.cc/GKJ729LQ].
21 Editorial Board, Who Will Kill or Be Killed in Violence-Plagued Chicago? The Algorithm
Knows,
CHI.
TRIB.
(May
10,
2016
5:00
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-gangs-police-loury-algorithm-edit-md20160510-story.html; Gorner, supra note 20; Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop Murder?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (July 20, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder.
22 Andrew V. Papachristos, CPD’s Crucial Choice: Treat Its List as Offenders or as Potential
Victims?,
CHI.
TRIB.
(July
29,
2016,
10:00
AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-gun-violence-list-chicago-policemurder-perspec-0801-jm-20160729-story.html.
23 Josh Kaplan, Predictive Policing and the Long Road to Transparency, SOUTH SIDE WKLY.
(July 12, 2017), https://southsideweekly.com/predictive-policing-long-road-transparency/.
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public.24 In lower Manhattan, a growing network of 9,000 linked cameras provide
real-time video to a centralized command center.25 Automated programs search for
faces, license plates, and other suspicious activity.26 In Baltimore, traditional
surveillance cameras are augmented by aerial cameras and sensors.27

Entire

neighborhoods have been filmed for days by private companies with the surveillance
data searchable for particular crimes which later can be turned over to police.28 In
other cities, police body cameras provide days’ worth of images uploaded to large
data warehouses.29 In Chicago, audio sensors record gunshots.30 In Washington
D.C., chemical sensors record suspicious substances.31 All across the country, cell
signals and digital clues held by third parties can be requested or even directly
intercepted by IMSI (“stingray”) devices.32 All across the internet landscape, social

24 See generally Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 959 (2013); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of
Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002).
25 Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data is Helping the NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE
(July 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness/; see also Somini
Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-cities.html.
26 See AOL, Digisensory Technologies Avista Smart Sensors, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2012),
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JamGobiS5wg; Associated Press, NJ City Leading Way in CrimeFighting Tech, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2010, 9:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nj-city-leadingway-in-crime-fighting-tech/.
27 Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secretsurveillance/.
28 Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for Several
Hours
at
a
Time,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
5,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/new-surveillance-technology-can-trackeveryone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-time/2014/02/05/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd844629433ba3_story.html?utm_term=.145394dbdb2b.
29 Matt Stroud, The Company That’s Livestreaming Police Body Camera Footage Right Now,
MOTHERBOARD (July 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/9a3ddv/visuallabs-police-body-camera-livestream.
30 Patrick M. O’Connell, Chicago Police Announce Expanded Technology to Curb Shootings,
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicagopolice-shotspotter-technology-met-20170127-story.html.
31 Michael J. Penders & William L. Thomas, Ecoterror: Rethinking Environmental Security
After September 11, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 159, 160 (2002).
32 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less than
a Wiretap, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 142 (2013).
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media can be watched and monitored for criminal activity.33 All of this data, big
and small, usable and quite revealing, can be monitored by law enforcement.
Third, growing data collection capabilities have provided incentives to create
new search technologies to interrogate the information. Federal law enforcement
entities have developed massive criminal justice databases filled with personal
information.34 States have developed smaller versions.35 Biometric databases now
include information about DNA, fingerprints, iris scans, tattoos, gait, facial
recognition, and other physical markers.36 These government databases have been
augmented on occasion by private data originally collected by for-profit data-broker
companies.37 Like other consumers, law enforcement can purchase the available
data to build larger systems.38 All of this data can be analyzed using powerful

33

Ben Austen, Public Enemies: Social Media is Fueling Gang War in Chicago, WIRED (Sept.
17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/underwire/2013/09/gangs-of-social-media/; Joseph
Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Seeking Clues to Gangs and Crimes, Detectives Monitor Internet Rap
Videos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/seeking-clues-togangs-and-crime-detectives-monitor-internet-rap-videos.html; Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social
Media
as
Crime-Fighting
Tool,
CNN
(Aug.
30,
2012,
5:23
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-media.
34 Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 803, 806–08 (2009); BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.,
FUSION
CENTER
GUIDELINES
2
(2006),
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf.
35 Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State and
Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 681 (2014).
36 Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote
Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 436–38 (2012); Ellen Nakashima, FBI
Prepares
Vast
Database
of
Biometrics,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
22,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/21/AR2007122102544.html; Wayne
A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1575 n.91 (2012); Craig Timberg & Ellen
Nakashima, State Photo-ID Databases Become Troves for Police, WASH. POST (June 16, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/state-photo-id-databases-become-troves-forpolice/2013/06/16/6f014bd4-ced5-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?utm_term=.c9c85764f6f8;
Sara Reardon, FBI Launches $1 billion Face Recognition Project, NEW SCI. (Sept. 7, 2012),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528804-200-fbi-launches-1-billion-face-recognitionproject/.
37 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial
Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
595, 597 (2004); Andrea Peterson, Your Location History is Like a Fingerprint. And Cops Can Get it
Without a Warrant., WASH. POST (July 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/07/31/your-location-history-is-like-a-fingerprint-and-cops-can-get-it-without-awarrant/?utm_term=.32d84715062a.
38 Bob Sullivan, Who's Buying Cell Phone Records Online? Cops, NBC (June 20, 2006, 11:59
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12534959/; Hoofnagle, supra note 37, at 597.
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computers and algorithms to divine hidden patterns and clues.39 Crimes can be
solved, suspects can be identified, and unseen connections revealed.
All of these technologies rely on data collection and analysis, with varying
degrees in the amount of data assembled. For example, place-based predictive
policing companies use collected crime statistics, which in large cities involves a
significant number of ever-changing data points (depending on the technology
used).40 However, person-based predictive policing uses fewer inputs to identify atrisk individuals, usually limited to traditional criminal justice inputs (arrests,
convictions, etc.).41 While data collection may target all of the people arrested in a
big city like Chicago, the types of data are not terribly extensive (especially
compared to other big data projects). Surveillance technologies can encompass a
tremendous amount of information if one thinks about the accumulated digital
footage of all police-worn body cameras, or all networked surveillance cameras, or
all cell site and other digital surveillance technologies. In addition, data mining
usually involves vast amounts of collected data, but again the definition of “vast”
compared to other types of datasets in a big data world may not be too
overwhelming.42 A biometric search of DNA in the FBI CODIS database is a search
of about 11.6 million, which covers a lot of people, but is a relatively small number

39

See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317, 322–23 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75
MISS. L.J. 139, 167–82 (2005).
40 DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, UPTURN, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON
“PREDICTIVE
POLICING”
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
3–5
(2016),
https://www.teamupturn.com/static/reports/2016/predictive-policing/files/Upturn_-_Stuck_In_a_
Pattern_v.1.01.pdf. However, some companies use only a very limited dataset. For example, PredPol,
a leading predictive policing company only uses three data points (crime type, time, and location).
How PredPol Works, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
41 Kaplan, supra note 23 (this information might include things like: “1. Age at most recent
arrest (the younger the age, the higher the score); 2. Incidents where victim of a shooting; 3. Incidents
where victim of an assault or battery; 4. Violent crime arrests; 5. Unlawful use of weapons arrests; 6.
Narcotics arrests (Wernick claimed that this is the least impactful variable, and does not seem to matter
that much to the model); 7. Trend in criminal activity (essentially whether or not an individual’s rate
of criminal activity is increasing or decreasing>”)).
42 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 9 (2013).
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for some big data systems.43

More expansive biometric databases are being

collected to search everything from iris patterns to tattoos, which increases the
variables, but still remains much smaller than other big data projects.44
The point of this overview is that big data policing provides a broad definition
of new law enforcement technologies which share certain similarities. These
technologies are digital with varying (but increasing) capabilities to collect, store,
and analyze the information.

And, for purposes of this essay, because these

technologies emerge from the real world of policing, they all share the same big
impediment: the problem of black data. As this essay seeks to offer insights for the
future of criminal law, big data, and the promotion of justice, the next sections raise
questions that must be answered on the theme of black data.

III.THE BLACK DATA PROBLEM
Big data policing is the future of law enforcement. But, it is a future that has
yet to confront the overlapping problems of transparency, racial bias, and
constitutional distortion. The solutions to the black data problem are not simple or
easy, but are necessary to engage in order to create a system that will be trusted by
communities and police alike. This Part seeks to examine the concerns that give rise
to the black data problem in the hopes that by exposing the issues, solutions will
emerge before wide-scale adoption of these new technologies.

43 Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773,
794–99, 821 (2015).
44 Donohue, supra note 36, at 415.
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A.Transparency: Black Data is Opaque
Big data policing has a transparency problem. By and large, ordinary citizens
cannot peer behind the algorithms that now control police patrol routes or human
target lists.45

More complicatedly, in some cases the code itself cannot be

interrogated, because of how machine learning and artificial intelligence systems
work.46 These machines learn from past data without human input, and thus cannot
simply be examined to reveal the code.47 Similarly, because of tactical and safety
considerations, police are reluctant to reveal the locations and use of surveillance
technologies. From a law enforcement perspective, it does little good to expose the
existence of surveillance schemes so that anyone can evade them.
These three transparency problems involving (1) technical barriers, (2)
technological barriers, and (3) tactical barriers must be overcome for big data
policing to be a success.

Unless police address the transparency problems,

communities will not trust the systems. And, without solutions to the transparency
problem, police will have no way to gain that trust.

1.

Technical Barriers

At a very basic level, the use of highly-technical systems undermines
transparency. Most police administrators and officers are not computer scientists
and must remain largely dependent on private companies to provide technical
guidance.48 In practice, this means that police purchase big data technologies
without the ability to interrogate them or even understand them. For patrol officers
See Stuart, supra note 19; Nissa Rhee, Study Casts Doubt on Chicago Police’s Secretive
“Heat List,” CHI. MAG. (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/August-2016/ChicagoPolice-Data/; Simmons, supra note 1, at 994.
46 Selbst, supra note 3.
47 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679–80 (2017).
48 Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 125, 130 (2017).
45
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on the street, this means blindly following predictive policing patrols without the
ability to challenge the findings or deconstruct its assumptions. For administrators,
it means trusting the algorithm based on the theory (or perhaps the result), but
without being able to articulate why the system works.49 This lack of transparency
is even more problematic when applied to predictive policing of individuals. A
police officer can see the result of the heightened “risk score,” but cannot really
explain how the score was calculated. As more and more bits of data get inputted
into a system, the more complicated it can be to visualize or explain the outputs. For
all intents and purposes, the data systems are dark to the end users and the
community.
Similar problems exist with automated surveillance monitoring technologies.50
Video systems pre-programed to alert to suspicious bags, audio sensors, or facial
recognition matches are susceptible to the limitations of the programming. 51 While
the systems themselves are transparent about the information they are providing to
police, there is little ability to determine if the automated alert will be accurate. So,
for example, in a system that has been programmed to automatically identify “handto-hand transactions” on the street (to signify a potential drug deal),52 the officers

49 Some companies have countered this concern by specifically addressing the “why” of why a
predictive technology works. Risk Terrain Modeling is one technology that focuses on the why. See
Samantha Melamed, Can Atlantic City’s Bold Experiment Take Racial Bias out of Predictive Policing?,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 10, 2017, 5:03 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/atlantic-cityrisk-terrain-modeling-rutgers-predictive-policing-joel-caplan-20170810.html.
50 Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 898–901 (2016).
51 For example, Shotspotter technology designed to identify gun shots can also mistakenly
identify fireworks. Peter Nickeas et al., Chicago Police Express Frustration after More than 100 Shot
in Violent Fourth of July Weekend, CHI. TRIB. (July 6, 2017, 6:30 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-july-4-weekend-shootings-violence20170705-story.html. Or threat scores that are designed to identify dangerous households can
erroneously flag an innocent house. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You:
Calculating
Your
Threat
‘Score,’
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
10,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-youcalculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html?utm_
term=.682fa950438e; CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEO. L. CTR. ON
PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACIAL RECOGNITION IN AMERICA
(2016), www.perpetuallineup.org.
52 See AOL, supra note 26.
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may end up responding to an alert without the ability to understand why the
computer alerted to a particular place or action. Officers must blindly trust the
system without being able to see or interpret the alerts.
Even something as simple as a static database has technical issues in terms of
being able to correct or audit the information. As criminal justice databases have
grown, there has been a parallel recognition that errors go uncorrected, systems go
unexamined, and injustices result.53 Much of the problem is that ordinary people
cannot see within the system, and even experts cannot fix data that is shared among
interconnected systems.54 So, an individual may not know about the database error,
but even if they did learn about it, a systems professional may not be able to correct
the errors among the proliferating and interconnected systems that have been
designed in a largely ad hoc manner. Once data gets corrupted, it is very hard to see
or cleanse the error throughout the various systems.55

2.

Technological Barriers

Beyond technical literacy, the very nature of big data technology thwarts
transparency. First, at a most basic level, computer code and algorithms hide the
inner workings of the systems.56 In addition, many predictive policing systems are
commercial operations, being privately owned and sold to law enforcement by
companies that wish to keep their trade secrets private.57 Naturally, in order to
protect the value of their commercial technology, companies try to keep the systems

53

Wayne A. Logan & Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 541, 541–44, 568–71 (2016).
54 Alex R. Hess, Herring v. United States: Are Errors in Government Databases Preventing
Defendants from Receiving Fair Trials?, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 129, 147 (2010).
55 Logan & Ferguson, supra note 53, at 588–91.
56 See Paul Ford, What is Code?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 11, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-paul-ford-what-is-code/.
57 See Joh, supra note 48, at 119; Ellen Huet, Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm
PredPol Promises to Map Crime Before It Happens, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/11/predpol-predictive-policing/#79a6c0e94f9b.
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hidden.58 Finally, the systems are complex, vacuuming up vast amounts of data
every day and trying to process this information for practical use. In the real world
of stopping and solving crime, there is less room for reflection or auditing of the
data. While, of course, one would hope such accountability checks would be put in
place, in practice, the pressures of daily data collection and analysis make such
retrospective evaluations less of a priority than stopping the next crime.
In the future, as more systems become more dependent on machine learning
and artificial intelligence, transparency will become even more difficult. With
newer big data models, the systems will be designed to teach themselves through
artificial intelligence, such that the model will constantly evolve based on
continuous learning.59 In such a system, the concept of transparency becomes almost
meaningless because one cannot interrogate the past system for future insight,
because the past system has already changed.60 In addition, the creators of the model
do not know what the model is doing to get the output because the machine has been
taught to learn from itself and not some visible, programed input.

3.

Tactical Barriers

Compounding the technical and technological difficulties are the realities of
police tactics. In the pursuit of catching bad guys, police prefer not to reveal their
proactive investigative strategies. Revealing the placement of surveillance sensors,
or how the heat list is created, might provide tactical advantage for those individuals
trying to avoid detection.61 Police, thus, naturally avoid transparency in order to
58 Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, All Tomorrow’s Crimes: The Future of Policing Looks
a Lot Like Good Branding, S.F. WKLY. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://archives.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/alltomorrows-crimes-the-future-of-policing-looks-alot-like-goodbranding/Content?oid=2827968&showFullText=true [https://perma.cc/G35D-F543].
59 Kroll et al., supra note 47, at 679–82.
60 Id. at 657–60.
61 Noah Hurowitz, NYPD Terrorism Boss Blasts Council Surveillance Oversight Bill as
‘Insane,’ DNAINFO (June 14, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20170614/civiccenter/surveillance-act-nypd-council-oversight-terrorism-commissioner (quoting John Miller, Deputy
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keep this perceived tactical advantage. Such caution sounds in part as a desire to
ensure effectiveness and officer safety, but also speaks to a traditional philosophy to
keep police practices relatively closed from public view.62

As many police

reformers have found, police processes remains decidedly non-transparent, with the
adoption of new technologies producing no different result.63

4.

Consequences

The consequences of these transparency problems create a real barrier to the
successful implementation of big data policing technologies. Secrecy leads to
community distrust. Complexity leads to outsourcing to third party experts. And,
for police and the communities alike, the technical, technological, and tactical
barriers make it difficult to understand if the systems work as advertised. The failure
to address these transparency issues risks delegitimizing data-driven strategies, even
if the technologies improve policing.
The push for transparency (or at least accountability) has created some pressure
to change the technologies. New predictive policing companies have advertised
themselves as being more transparent, even going so far as to release their basic code
and describe their computer models’ approach to removing bias.64 Others have
exposed their underlying models to academic scrutiny,65 and yet others have
Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism, “Terrorists and criminals do their due diligence
and they literally study and adapt to evolving security measures.”).
62 Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1129
(2013) (“In practice, police chiefs and other local government actors often limit rather than promote
information availability.”).
63 See id. at 1133.
64 Joshua Brustein, The Ex-Cop at the Center of Controversy Over Crime Prediction Tech,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (July 10, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-0710/the-ex-cop-at-the-center-of-controversy-over-crime-prediction-tech; Dave Gershgorn, Software
Used to Predict Crime Can Now Be Scoured for Bias, QUARTZ MEDIA (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://qz.com/938635/a-predictive-policing-startup-released-all-its-code-so-it-can-be-scoured-forbias/.
65 See, e.g., JIE XU ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., CRIME GENERATORS FOR SHOOTINGS IN
URBAN AREAS: A TEST USING CONDITIONAL LOCATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AS AN EXTENSION OF RISK
TERRAIN MODELING (2010); Joel M. Caplan et al., Joint Utility of Event-Dependent and Environmental
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explicitly attempted to explain why the outputs from the models come out the way
they do.66 Some of this transparency is driven by public political pressure over use,
and some is driven by internal concern that the systems need to work before
investing police money in the systems. In recent years, there have been more than
a few glimmers of light illuminating the transparency and accountability problem.

B.Race: Black Data is Racially-Encoded
Big data policing is still policing, and law enforcement has long struggled with
concerns of racial bias.67 Adding in data collection and analysis or new surveillance
systems does not remove the potential threat of racial discrimination.68 The data
collected, the streets watched, and the police themselves do not change just because
of new technologies. Big data policing cannot ignore the resulting racial impact,
and in order to be successful, must address the complex realities of policing and race
in many American cities. How police patrol, how they respond to problem areas,
and how they deal with communities without political power all can potentially
influence the discriminatory impact of big data policing and thereby expose the
problem of black data policing.

Crime Analysis Techniques for Violent Crime Forecasting, 59 CRIME & DELINQ. 243 (2013); George
O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 110 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
1399 (2015).
66 See, e.g., LESLIE W. KENNEDY ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
TEST OF RISK TERRAIN MODELING AND A PLACE-BASED EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK-BASED
PATROL DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES (2015).
67 See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 59–61 (2017); POLICING THE BLACK
MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 178–233 (Angela Davis ed., 2017).
68 See Ezekiel Edwards, Predictive Policing Software is More Accurate at Predicting Policing
than
Predicting
Crime,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
31,
2016,
2:58
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/predictive-policing-reform_us_57c6ffe0e4b0e60d31dc9120;
Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016, 5:55 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/what_the_fbi_s_surveillance_of_mart
in_luther_king_says_about_modern_spying.html; Simmons, supra note 1, at 980.
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1.

Police Patterns

In some jurisdictions, race and place are so closely intertwined that policing
certain places means a disproportionate impact on communities of color.69 If the
crime data collected from particular areas becomes the only data in the system, then
police data systems will mirror police patrols, not necessarily actual crime rates.70
In addition, not all crime is reported in what we know as official crime
statistics.71 For example, if police arrests become a data point for crime statistics, a
strategic focus on particular communities of color could result in discriminatory
outcomes. Other distortions can occur because certain communities may not report
crime.

One DOJ report claimed that more than 50% of violent crime goes

unreported.72 Other researchers have correctly noted that certain crimes (sexual
assault, domestic violence) remain seriously underreported to police.73 In recent
months, due to a crackdown on immigration enforcement, police have seen a marked
decrease in reported crimes in areas with high Latino populations.74 This decrease
is not necessarily the result of less crime, but rather less reporting due to a fear of
community members being deported.
Because of this fear of biased or incomplete data, several predictive policing
technologies have specifically avoided including any arrest data in their models.75

69

See generally I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43,
62–71 (2009).
70 Jack Smith IV, Crime-Prediction Tool May be Reinforcing Discriminatory Policing, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2016, 7:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/predictive-policingdiscriminatory-police-crime-2016-10.
71 Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes Per Year Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Aug. 9, 2012, 10:00 AM),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm.
72 Id.
73 Id..; See, also e.g., Camille Carey & Robert A. Solomon, Impossible Choices: Balancing
Safety and Security in Domestic Violence Representation, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 201, 225 (2014);
Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006).
74 John Burnett, New Immigration Crackdowns Creating ‘Chilling Effect’ On Crime Reporting,
NPR (May 25, 2017, 4:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529513771/new-immigrationcrackdowns-creating-chilling-effect-on-crime-reporting.
75 Both PredPol and HunchLab specifically address this potential problem by not including
arrest statistics in their models.
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Instead, they rely on reported crimes or calls for service, assuming that allegations
of crime victimhood (i.e. calling police for assistance) will be more representative
than police suspicion in the form of arrests.76 Not all predictive policing companies
follow this limitation and so the impact of patrol patterns and police targeting could
impact the final results, depending on the system chosen.
In addition, person-based predictive models may result in seemingly racially
discriminatory effects. For example, if the algorithm that identifies people on the
heat list includes information about prior arrests, or connections with people who
are arrested, then where police are looking for arrests will impact the resulting risk
identification system.77 Obviously, to be arrested police need probable cause to
arrest, and a number of violent arrests could be reasonable data points to record and
utilize in an algorithm, but there may still be a racial impact if some of the variables
involve arrests (even if justified by good police practice). More problematic are
gang affiliations, which tend to correlate with racial minorities in many cities and
have no standardized method of correctly identifying gang members.78 Errors
proliferate in gang systems, meaning that this data can impact risk scores and
therefore police interaction with those individuals.79
Complicating the racial impact is the fact that crime does tend to correlate with
poverty and in many urban areas those poor areas also correlate with communities
of color.80 The people getting shot in cities like Chicago, New Orleans, Kansas City,
and New York City are disproportionately minority men. 81
76

Police are using

See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 1153–54.
See Kaplan, supra note 23.
78 Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
115, 118 (2005).
79 Associated Press, Immigrant Sues Chicago Police Alleging Gang Database Error, ABC
NEWS (July 11, 2017, 6:29 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/amp/US/wireStory/immigrant-sues-chicagopolice-alleging-gang-database-error-48567964; CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 3 (2016), https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf (finding
numerous errors in the California gang database).
80 See Jack Smith IV, ‘Minority Report’ is Real—And It’s Really Reporting Minorities, MIC
(Nov. 9, 2015), http://mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-isreally-reporting-minorities#.zwXVV93jm [https://perma.cc/35GD-56VL].
81 See,
e.g.,
Tracking
Homicides
in
Chicago,
CHI.
TRIB.,
http://homicides.redeyechicago.com/races/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
77
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technology to identify people they think are involved in violence, and a review of
the individuals who make the top risk scores on the heat list in Chicago show that
they are young men of color. Further, many individuals suspected to be in gangs, or
who associate with individuals involved in crime, share race-similar friend groups.
If associational suspicion from friend groups is part of the analysis, then people of
the same social groups will be more likely to be linked in the same network.
This is not to say that predictive policing is intentionally racially
discriminatory, but only that, like traditional policing, it suffers from implicit and
explicit racial biases, and tracks the structural problems inherent in policing.82 None
of the algorithms use race in their model (and in fact strip it out), but the perception
(correctly) is that the technologies end up targeting communities of color.
Some of the challenge has been to overcome media reports and research reports
that sensationalize the potential racial issues.83 For example, a recent report by the
Human Rights Data Analysis Group applied arrest and drug data using PredPol’s
algorithm to conclude that the algorithm contributed to racial bias,84 despite the fact
that PredPol does not use any drug crimes or arrest data in its model. Yet, the
resulting media coverage slammed PredPol for being racially discriminatory, despite
the misleading analysis.85
In order for big data policing to be accepted, it will need to address and
overcome this perceived race problem. Predictive policing technologies will be
looked at with deserved suspicion unless they can assure communities they do not
reify racial inequalities. This assurance is difficult when the end result looks
Bryan Llenas, Brave New World of ‘Predictive Policing’ Raises Specter of High-Tech Racial
Profiling, FOX NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/02/24/brave-newworld-predictive-policing-raises-specter-high-tech-racial-profiling/ [https://perma.cc/N65R-JDND];
Sidney Perkowitz, Crimes of the Future, AEON (Oct. 27, 2016), https://aeon.co/essays/should-we-trustpredictive-policing-software-to-cut-crime.
83 See, e.g., William Isaac & Andi Dixon, Why Big Data Analysis of Police Activity is Inherently
Biased, PBS (May 10, 2017, 2:42 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/column-big-dataanalysis-police-activity-inherently-biased.
84 Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016, at 15.
85 See, e.g., Jack Smith IV, Crime Prediction Tool PredPol Amplifies Racially Biased Policing,
Study Shows, MIC (Oct. 9, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-tool-pred-polonly-amplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows#.a7kBWFQyI.
82
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discriminatory (or looks to justify a racially disparate effect). The stated concern is
that predictive technologies could create a self-fulfilling feedback loop where biased
data collection predicts future biased patrols, which in turn creates more suspicion
in these areas.86 Worse, the predictive scores can be justified because of the
“objectivity” of the data, ignoring that all of the data collection comes from human
police officers.

2.

Power and Powerlessness

Poor communities of color have had a fraught history with police surveillance.
In fact, the history of policing is deeply intertwined with racialized police practices.87
From the post-slavery patrols, to surveillance of the civil rights movement in the
1960s, to monitoring of the Black Lives Matter movement in this decade, AfricanAmericans have felt the negative impact of police surveillance in pointed and
pervasive ways.88 And, during the entire span of those movements, every day police
surveillance and harassment has been a point of tension in poor, minority
communities.89
Racial bias, thus, remains a concern for the implementation of big data policing
techniques. While inanimate algorithms or surveillance cameras cannot be racially
biased, how the technologies are built, used, and where they are located can have
discriminatory impacts. For this reason, some concern has been raised about the

86

Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuit of Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013,
10:48 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-crime/.
87 See Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities,
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 66–69 (2014); R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and
the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 333, 386–92 (1998); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. ET AL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING
STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES 24, 52–53 (1995).
88 See generally Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and
Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156 (2001); Bedoya, supra note 68; FERGUSON, supra
note 6, at 133–34.
89 See BUTLER, supra note 67, 59–61; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:
Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268–69 (1999).

20

Ferguson—Draft—February 2018
implementation of certain big data surveillance techniques. The Baltimore Police
and the FBI used aerial surveillance on police brutality protesters after the death of
Freddie Gray, as part of a pattern of surveillance of individuals involved with the
Movement for Black Lives.90

Large scale aerial mass surveillance has been

conducted on poor minority areas (including Compton, California, and West
Baltimore), and use of the other types of high tech surveillance has been directed at
minority neighborhoods.91

For communities conscious of racial inequality in

policing, these initial big data policing experiments signal a pattern to use such
technologies more on poor communities of color, than non-minority communities.
It is important not to overstate the placement issue because predictive policing
technologies have been applied across jurisdictions and surveillance technologies
have also been placed in business districts and places of great wealth and power.92
But, politically weak communities face a greater risk and danger from the
implementation. If history is any guide, “color of surveillance”93 tends to be black
and brown and dark.

3.

Consequences

From one perspective, surveillance technologies could offer the potential for
unbiased policing strategies both by removing race from the computer models and
relying on objective surveillance and sensor technologies. In fact, this is one reason
90 Ian Duncan, New Details Released About High-Tech Gear FBI Used on Planes to Monitor
Freddie
Gray
Unrest,
BALT.
SUN
(Oct.
30,
2015,
7:04
PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-fbi-surveillance-flights20151030-story.html.
91 Laura Moy, Yet Another Way Baltimore Police Unfairly Target Black People, SLATE (Aug.
18, 2016, 1:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/08/18/21altimore_police_
use_surveillance_technology_to_target_black_neighborhoods.html.
92 One of the more surveilled places on earth is lower Manhattan by the financial district in
New York City. Chris Dolmetsch & Henry Goldman, New York, Microsoft Unveil Join CrimeTracking
System,
BLOOMBERG
TECH.
(Aug.
8,
2012,
7:19
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-08/new-york-microsoft-unveil-joint-crimetracking-system.
93 See Bedoya, supra note 68.
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why these technologies have been embraced by communities struggling with policecitizen racial tensions (heightened over the last few years).94 But, if implemented
carelessly, or without recognition of the racial and discriminatory impacts (real or
perceived) arising from traditional policing practices, these same technologies can
become perceived as illegitimate.
Police need to confront these legacy effects of racial discrimination and not
pretend that they do not also impact a data-driven policing strategy. In addition,
because of this historical (mis)understanding, police must not blind themselves to
the reality that some of their data-driven insights may be influenced by biased data.
There exists a real concern of creating a self-reinforcing feedback loop which is
driven more by police patterns than crime patterns. There also exists a potential to
create two surveillance systems—one focused on poor people and another on
communities that have the political and economic means to keep the cameras away.
Fortunately, companies have begun prioritizing avoiding racial bias. Because
of the media coverage about possible racial bias, and the growing community
concern, police and predictive policing companies have sought ways to avoid biased
impacts. While certainly not solved, the issue of race is flagged and will likely not
be papered over by an appeal to technological objectivity. For all the fancy math,
the reality of big data policing is that it still involves human police officers and
human criminal suspects and the ability of technologists to adapt to this known
human fallibility.

C.Law: Black Data is Distorting Constitutional Doctrine
Big data technologies threaten to distort a Fourth Amendment doctrine that
emerged from a small data era.95 Early court decisions which interpreted probable
cause and reasonable suspicion did so in a context where much of the information
94
95

See FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 28–31.
See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 336–38.
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came from small data sources—namely police observation, analogue police
investigation, and local information sharing.96 These small data rules can become
distorted in a big data world, where mass surveillance systems, mass data collection,
and data mining radically expand the available inputs.97 Because there exists more
data to sort through, when that information is applied against a small data rule, it can
change how police and courts interpret suspicion.98 In addition, more extensive
surveillance technology has already begun to alter privacy expectations in a world
of “panvasive” monitoring.99
As a general matter, courts have not addressed the legal implications of the rise
of big data policing. A few courts have weighed in on the dangers of data error,100
and more have wrestled with expectations of privacy in an interconnected, digital
age101 (including the Supreme Court which will decide how the Fourth Amendment
should apply to cell-site location tracking in Carpenter v. United States).102 But, by
in large, courts have not had to think through the potential distortions of new
technology on old law. This section briefly summarizes a few of the questions
presented by big data policing.

1.

Shadows Around Suspicion

Accepting arguendo that predictive policing achieves what it promises—the
ability to forecast higher risk places and people who might be involved in crime,

96

See id. at 337–38.
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 281, 285–86 (2011); Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42
PEPP. L. REV. 773, 803–05 (2015).
98 See Simmons, supra note 1, at 983–97, 999–1006.
99 Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, 82 MISS. L.J. 307, 308 (2013).
100 See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012); Herring v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009); United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
102 See Stephen E. Henderson, Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth Amendment: The Best
Way Forward, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2017); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-402).
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then it is important to understand how that prediction might impact police officers
on the streets and judges in court. Or, in other words, how does a prediction impact
Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion?
Take, for example, the use of place-based predictive policing technology in a
city. Officers are provided a map (paper or digital) that signals the higher risk areas
of crime. Police officers are tasked to patrol these areas when time permits within
their other duties in the hopes that the additional police presence at the correct places
will deter criminal activity.

From a police officer’s perspective, a computer

algorithm has provided some additional information about the likelihood of a
particular activity at a particular place and a particular time. Police officers are not
told what to do with this information, but one can imagine that it not only does, but
probably should, impact how police view the areas in which they patrol. As they
drive through a predicted area, police will be on the lookout for individuals who
might be likely thieves. The predictive information will color how they view the
actions in those areas and may result in tipping the scales in favor of suspicion.103
After all, the suspicious man loitering near a parked car might just be waiting for a
ride, but he might also be waiting to steal one.
The issue becomes even more difficult in court. If the officer does stop the
man, and if the man does have implements of car theft (slim jim, screwdriver, high
tech lock pick, etc.), there will be a question of whether this evidence should be
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. A judge will face the following legal
question: did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop a man loitering near a
parked car, and does the fact that the suspect was in an area of predicted car theft
impact the constitutional analysis? I have written previously about how I think the
analysis might come out, but the short answer is that we do not know what a judge
might do.104

103 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J.
259, 304 (2012).
104 See id. at 312.
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Similarly, right now in Chicago the police have incorporated their “heat list”
risk score into their police computer dashboard.105 The result is that this number (1500+) shows up next to the letters SSL (strategic subjects list) to symbolize a
forecast level of risk of violence. This information provides a revealing and perhaps
damning context of the individual’s potential risk of violence. Whereas before an
officer might judge the individual based on actions (what did the individual do to
justify police suspicion), now this observational information can be filtered through
a data-rich criminal background history. As currently utilized, this heat list has
become a “virtual most wanted list” for individuals suspected of being involved in
crime.106
But, the real ground-breaking shift will be when facial recognition technology
can be used to match individuals on the street to risk-scores in a computer.107 While
currently such real-time facial recognition technology does not exist—being limited
to stationary video cameras—the technology is being developed to deploy facial
recognition on police cameras and even police body-worn cameras.108 In this new
world, the combination of facial recognition and the heat list will mean that each
person on the street can be scored and tracked.
Again, in thinking about suspicion, if police observed the suspect loitering by
the car in an area of predicted car theft and also were alerted to the fact that the man
had three prior convictions for car theft, then the question will be how this
information should impact reasonable suspicion.
105

From the police officer’s

See Kaplan, supra note 23.
See Jessica Saunders et al., Predictions Put Into Practice: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation
of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 347, 363–64 (2016); Matt Stroud,
Chicago’s Predictive Policing Tool Just Failed a Major Test: A RAND Report Shows that the ‘Strategic
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perspective, this additional information adds to the suspicion. Knowing the suspect
is a three-time convicted car thief makes it more likely that he might be up to no
good this time. On the other hand, even former car thieves have the right to wait on
the street without being stopped by police. More troubling, if merely being in the
predicted area with a high risk score is enough for suspicion, then the algorithm (not
the individual’s actions or the police officer’s observation) is reducing the level of
Fourth Amendment protection. The basic point is that the predicted risk score
distorts traditional Fourth Amendment analysis because such information will likely
impact the police officer’s determination of suspicion.109
So far, courts have not weighed in on the subject of how predictive policing
impacts the Fourth Amendment. But, clearly predictive analytics has the potential
to distort existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.

Because there exists more

information about each suspect, this background information will alter the judgment
of police, and the court’s deference to this discretionary decision. Before big data
analytics becomes too engrained in police practice, courts and lawyers will need to
address the impact of these new technologies on the Fourth Amendment.

2.

Shadows Around Surveillance

The rise of new surveillance technologies has already begun to impact the
Fourth Amendment’s conception of privacy. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court
has recognized the revealing nature of smartphones and digital GPS tracking.110 The
2017–18 Carpenter case will address the future of the third party doctrine in a world
where almost all digital devices and communications go through third party
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intermediaries.111 Law enforcement routinely requests records for cell sites, internet
searches, smart devices, transportation services (like Uber and Lyft), and many other
types of digital clues. This form of investigation will only increase in the future,
thus, creating new legal challenges.112
Constitutional law, as it usually does, muddles along applying analogue
analogies to digital realities, and doing the best it can to adapt to a new age.113 But,
many of the questions about expectations of privacy are still unanswered. The
internet of things is turning our old-fashioned “effects” into trackable
technologies.114 Almost all of the things we used to think as our “papers” now exist
in digital (non-paper) form.115 Our “houses” are becoming “smart,” revealing
intimate details through smart monitors and devices.116 Even our “persons” can be
augmented with digitally revealing medical devices and sensors. In fact, in an age
of ubiquitous connectivity and mass surveillance, the idea of expectations of privacy
may need to be rethought.
The problem of black data policing raises all of these complicated questions.
What society once understood to be the legal framework for analysis can appear
distorted through a big data lens. Generally speaking legislatures have not acted to
keep statutory law current with technological threats, so privacy protections remain
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fragmented and unclear. New surveillance technologies are eroding privacy, but
what the law has to say about the matter is largely unclear.

3.

Consequences

The legal system is not unused to adapting to new technologies.117 The
difficulty is that the technologies change much faster than the law. Courts are
relatively slow compared to the ever-changing landscape of technology. Big cases
will arise with some guidance from the Supreme Court, but most of the development
will happen slowly, case by case.
Police will also adapt to new legal realities. As one example of how predictive
policing companies might adapt to potential legal challenge, HunchLab initially
marketed a predictive policing product that provided risk maps that changed as the
officers drove through the area.118 For example, an officer might drive from a high
burglary area to a high theft area and watch the map change colors as she drove. 119
But, recognizing that this knowledge might distort the officer’s suspicion or actions,
Hunchlab decided to “blind” the officer to the type of crime at issue. In doing so,
they tried to address the distortions of suspicion and the potential bias.
. . . HunchLab’s approach to overcoming bias is to provide less
information, not more. It doesn’t tell police why a box is selected or even
whether it’s a high- or average-risk zone. . . . HunchLab works off the
notion it’s better for officers not to know too much.
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“This shouldn’t be justification to stop someone,” [Jeremy] Heffner [of
HunchLab] said. “That’s why we actually hide a lot from the officers. We
don’t tell them the likelihood that a robbery will happen, because people
get hung up on probabilities. The goal isn’t to go into these places and
make a bunch of arrests. The goal is to have nothing happen.”120

Such a change might well avoid the concerns of an algorithm distorting reasonable
suspicion. It might also provide a helpful random-control sample to be able to test
HunchLab’s theory. Of course, the change might prove to be not quite as effective
as providing that crime-type information to officers tasked to stop crime. In the
current moment, the debate about the appropriate balance between effectiveness and
bias-prevention has yet to be worked out as technologies continue to develop and
respond to legal and community pressure.

IV.CONTEXTUALIZING THE DARKNESS OF BLACK DATA POLICING
The problems of black data—transparency, racial bias, and unclear
constitutional protections—are not really new to policing. Traditional policing
suffers from many of the same problems. What is interesting is the way digital
technologies expose or heighten the risks of these problems in a more visual way.
With data, one can see the long-standing problems more clearly.
First, as to this heightening effect, it would be misleading to characterize
policing as having been an overly transparent profession. For years, it has been
difficult to get any good data on policing practices (who was stopped, why, or how
often).121 Because of the fragmented nature of the policing profession, it has always

120
121

Melamed, supra note 49 (internal quotations omitted).
Harmon, supra note 62, at 1129.

29

Ferguson—Draft—February 2018
been hard to see general patterns or study national practices.122 And, of course, one
cannot get inside a police administrator’s or police officer’s head to see how the
decisions about suspicion actually occur. So, it seems somewhat unfair to criticize
an opaque algorithm shaping police suspicion as being a new problem.
Yet, the fear of opaqueness—the perceived general lack of accountability
surrounding big data policing—is real and has been a powerful argument against
predictive policing and other new technologies. It somehow seems more obvious to
highlight the black box nature of the computer model than the black box nature of
the human mind. Perhaps the difference is that we see the algorithmic models as
new and thus changeable, and do not see the same with people. But, the fear is
clearly a heightened one that comes from an uncomfortableness with new
technology.
Similarly, researchers have solid empirical evidence that racial bias (both
explicit and implicit) has affected policing patterns in the past (and the present).123
So, again it seems a bit unfair to critique big data models for being biased when they
are in fact equal, or even less biased than the status quo. Yet, even though we know
that bias exists in policing, that human failing somehow feels less threatening than
a computer making a similar bad judgment. With a computer program we have a
thing that caused the error which might make it easier to cast a skeptical eye, rather
than indicting the entire policing system as biased.
Finally, most scholars agree that the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
standard is not a model of clarity.124 Most police officers would likely agree as they
are constantly second guessed in court and on the streets. The limited training in the
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police academy about “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” provides little
concrete guidance on the streets, so frustration can grow about the lack of clear rules.
The fact that technology may also distort these unclear rules may thus not be a new
problem. And, depending on how the information is provided, it might actually
refine the process of establishing reasonable suspicion.125
Perhaps this heightened focus on big data policing will be a positive thing,
because maybe the concern about black data will allow us to address some of the
underlying problems of all too human policing. The truth is that it is easier to be
vigilant about computer code than people. Code or computer models can be
designed to be accountable (if not transparent), to be policed for bias, and to be
regulated by legal rules. Unlike people, designers can test the inputs, and test the
outputs. Unlike people, we can relatively easily change the system when we have
identified the problems. In fact, each of the black data problems of opacity, human
judgment, and uncertain rules are routine design problems for most data-driven
systems.
The difficulty is that police or technologists have not started from this premise
of designing a system that focuses on the black data problems. Instead, much of the
technology has been sold as papering over some of those underlying human issues.
In a world where the community is concerned about police brutality, data-driven
policing sounds like an objective solution. So, the focus has been on selling big data
systems, not addressing black data problems. If overcoming black data policing
becomes a priority, and the hard questions about design are asked at the outset, many
of the problems, and much of the fear of a big data policing future, can be illuminated
and addressed.

125

Simmons, supra note 1, at 999–1009.

31

